Abstract. -For more than a decade the Peruvian guerrilla organization Sendero Luminoso had been considered one of the most powerful military groups in the recent history of Latin America. Through its growing presence in almost all parts of the country and its often spectacular military operations Sendero Luminoso not only seemed ubiquitous but, in the course of time, also an imposing threat to the Peruvian State. Until now only little is known about the mechanisms with which Sendero Luminoso mobilized the resources it needed most in order to pursue its fight: people, money, and armament. Taking a look inside the organization reveals surprising findings. Sendero Luminoso was a much weaker organization than most contemporary observers had believed. Only with great efforts it was able to mobilize its core resources. While it was successful in attracting and recruiting new party members to its files it failed to generate a strong and durable financial backbone. As a result its armament was poor. Thus, Sendero's organizational reality resembled its public appearance only rudimentarily. However, Sendero Luminoso aptly adapted to the situation through adjusting its military tactics and securing organizational coherence. Furthermore it strongly benefited from the political and economic weakness the Peruvian State demonstrated throughout the conflict. That way Sendero Luminoso was able to create the credible public image of an organization of great military force.
Introduction
"Estamos perdiendo la guerra".by surprise. Almost exactly ten years to that month a small and widely unknown group of mainly university professors and students had launched its guerra popular against the Peruvian State. Having been belittled initially by the general public and national media as "Senderito Luminoso" 2 , Sendero Luminoso (SL), or "Shining Path", soon proved to be of permanent nature spreading fast beyond its geographical origins and developing what seemed a surprisingly strong and coherent organizational and ideological vigor. The cradle and starting point of its expansion had been the department of Ayacucho together with its neighboring departments of Huancavelica and Apurí-mac. The fact that SL had its roots in the rural highlands let observers and scholars first interpret it as a primarily peasant organization attributing its rise to an existing subsistence crisis of the peasants and a lack of governmental reform and public modernization. 3 In the light of the steady geographical expansion of the Shining Path subsequent studies rather highlighted the universitarian character of the party, the unfulfilled economic and social aspirations of university graduates, and the various, yet interrelated socioeconomical and political crises the country faced throughout the time period of the internal conflict. 4 As some studies have shown, SL's expansion featured certain analogies throughout the country. In almost all regional contexts SL ably aggravated and exploited existing conflicts between local social agents. And through resuming former state duties, e.g. ensuring (its own) law and order, it was even able to gain some sort of basic public sympathy. However, its rigid Weltanschauung and its use of indiscriminate force quickly alienated great parts of the local population. 5 By the end of the eighties, by now heavily hit Peru, 1980 -1995 (Durham 1998 by military forces in its core departments, SL also intensified its operations in the country's capital Lima -causing a highly controversial internal debate. Its growing presence in the country's political and economic center was of enormous military and psychological importance for the course of the conflict. Within a few years SL boosted the number of its operations significantly -car bombs, selective assassinations of political opponents, and acts of sabotage to relevant infrastructure caused a public climate of fear and nourished the apprehension of an advancing break down of the Peruvian State. 6 A bit more than a decade after the advent of its armed battle "Senderito" seemed closing in to its military victory.
Problem
How was a small group of professors, teachers, and students able to become the "most brutal and fanatical guerrilla group in Latin America" 7 ? How did SL mobilize the resources necessary to develop a lasting organiza tional structure and to stage an armed conflict? These are the central questions of this article. Although SL quickly collapsed after its founder Abimael Guzmán and other members of its central committee were arrested in September 1992, its constant expansion points to its capability to permanently recruit and mobilize resources within changing local environments. This achievement is underlined by different scholars; Michael L. Smith states:
"What is unique about Sendero is that it has set off on this Andean jihad without first having a slice of power and resources. It is also striking to see this strategy played out on the Peruvian map with almost Prussian precision." "Shining Path defines the setting in the ways that make revolutions the only possible outcome, and then wages revolution on its own terms. Thus insurgency itself becomes the independent variable, not dependent on social, economic, or external factors."
11
Despite these assessments surprisingly little is known to date about the exact mechanisms of SL's resource mobilization. The major reason for that dissatisfying finding may be the scarcity of party data, or more precisely, the difficult access to it. The empirical core of this article is composed by data gathered in various Peruvian archives. For the first time extensive internal party data from the archives of the Peruvian Counter-Terrorist Police, the Dirección Contra el Terrorismo (DIRCOTE), has been made available to an investigator. 12 The reviewed documents cover the whole time period of the armed conflict and they assemble amongst other things reports drafted by regional party commanders, minutes of different regional and national party committees, political analysis of the party leadership, internal surveys regarding the number and regional assignment of party members, financial statistics, armament registers, certificates, administrative dossiers, testimonies, and party curricula. These documents allow for a detailed analysis of internal party processes and discussions. However, their informative value is limited: Minutes, for example, written by party leaders often modify or omit criticism voiced by low rank party members. In addi-10 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, Sendero and the Threat of Narcoterrorism (New York 1990), p. 171.
11 David Scott Palmer, "Introduction": idem (ed.), The Shining Path of Peru (London 1992), p. 1-14, here: p. 13.
12 Due to the support of judge Dr. Pablo Talavera Elguera the author was able to review extensive parts of the archive of the DIRCOTE. The documents are cited with the contemporary name of this police unit, DINCOTE. The works of Benedicto Jiménez Bacca, the founder of the special police unit that captured Abimael Guzmán are also based on documents from the same archive. However, they lack all necessary formal and scientific requirements such as the proper identification of citations or sources; Benedicto Jiménez Bacca, Inicio, desarrollo y ocaso del terrorismo en el Perú. El ABC de Sendero Luminoso y el MRTA (Lima 2000) and idem, Inicio, desarrollo y ocaso del terrorismo en el Perú (Lima 2004). tion most testimonies captured party members gave to the police and to the security forces have to be interpreted carefully since we do not know the circumstances in which they were given: Some may only have been obtained through violent interrogation methods while others may only contain that kind of information that would have led to lower jail sentences for the accused.
Firstly, the article analyses the basic principles of the recruitment process. Through social networks and by implementing a rigorous selection SL ensured that only those persons became party members who had demonstrated successfully their ideological and personal unconditional commitment to the party course. Secondly, the much less successful process of generating financial resources will be discussed. Although the party was actively involved in the drug trafficking, its financial situation maintained continuously deficient, preventing the party access to the continental and global black-market arms trade. As a consequence, thirdly, the armament of SL was limited. Often, party members had to produce weapons and ammunition on their own. However, SL was able to create the public image of an organization of massive military force. This was achieved through adjusting its military action and carrying through single, yet precise and spectacular or symbolic attacks obtaining strong public psychological effects.
The resource mobilization of Sendero Luminoso
In order to expand from a regional, almost unknown phenomenon to a complex and nation-wide operating military apparatus SL had to be able to mobilize permanently a sufficient bundle of different resources. At least three resources were indispensable: people, money, and arms. Only the recruitment of sufficient combat-willing activists and members would allow for a military operation. But in order to have a realistic perspective of success it was also necessary to generate a steady flow of financial resources and, of course, of adequate armament.
The recruitment process

Basic Principles
From the beginning the party leadership paid utmost attention to the selection of new party members. The conviction of being an elite party that allowed access only to the most capable and most committed persons was of central importance. Accordingly the recruitment was based on stern principles and a rigorous selection process in which the candidates had to prove their talent and their unconditional obedience to the party.
The belief to be the home only of a selected few was highlighted repeatedly by Abimael Guzmán and party leaders. At the beginning of the eighties a party document advised to select only those candidates who had demonstrated highest dedication:
"Es necesario que no todos pueden ingresar al Partido; las masas están compuestas de elementos activos, intermedios e indiferentes; es necesario promover a los elementos activos a la categoría de militantes revolucionarios." 13 In 1990 another party document expressed high demands to be fulfilled by party members:
"forjar cuadros políticos, militares, organizadores, teóricos que manejen el marxismo, apuntar a especialización, especializarse por ejemplo en el manejo de la economía, en relaciones internacionales, diplomacia, propaganda, cuadros que escriban, etc."
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Given such an elitist self-image it is not surprising that SL only had a small total number of members. Corresponding to the Truth Commission SL begun its battle with some 500 members and an unspecified number of "simpatizantes más cercanos". 15 Confiscated party data showed that until 1990 the total number of members had risen to at least 2.626. 16 Based on recently reviewed documents from 1991 it is now possible to assess yet another grow of the membership until January that year up to 3.454 people divided into 613 party cells.
17
Becoming a party member was not easy. Jeremy Weinstein identified three mechanisms that intended to provide access only to the most distinguished candidates. On the one hand already active members had to vouch for new entrants. On the other hand new members were subjected to a process of intense ideological indoctrination. Finally, membership could only be acquired after passing a multi-level process in which the candidates moved slowly from one hierarchy level to the other. 18 However, Weinstein's observation has to be complemented by recognizing that all three mechanisms did not work independently from each other but rather as one complex arrangement. Additionally, further elements of control existed. According to some observers it could last up to three years to become a full party member.
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Social networks encouraged and facilitated the recruitment of a significant part of SL members. Personal networks and kinship provided the fertile background to discuss and distribute informally the ideology and political agenda of SL and to get a first impression of the seriousness of a possible candidate. Lewis Taylor observes:
"recruitment was effected by close relatives or friends. Brothers or sisters would enroll their siblings and cousins, children their mothers or fathers and vice versa, so that extended senderista families developed in town and country."
20
A senderista arrested in 1992 testified that both her brother and her husband, whom she met at the San Marcos University, had been arrested and murdered by state security forces for being members of SL. 21 Similar cases can be found in the database of the Truth Commission. 22 In this way social networks performed an important role connecting aspirants with the party. A good example for the impact of social networks can be observed looking at the composition of the senior party leadership. Since his arrival in Ayacucho and his first political activities in the sixties Abimael Guzmán had consciously selected his closest comrades thereby spinning a fine net of personal friendships. Several influential -and frequently related -local families played an important part of this network. Later on these "sacred families"
23 provided SL with some of its most important leaders. But despite their relevance, social networks alone were not sufficient in order to become a full-fledged party member. A party document from 1985 informs about the different conditions that had to be fulfilled to earn the membership:
"se presenta carta que debe ser claramente explicada, plantear quién es y datos que especifiquen su edad, estudios, trabajo, procedencia de sus padres, su participación en la lucha de clases. Cómo ve al Partido y claramente su petición de incorporación. Una petición de incorporación debe estar evaluada por 2 militantes que puedan garantizar por él y el Comité que lo admite debe estudiar seriamente esa petición y el Comité debe comprobar las cosas; luego se entra en condición de premilitante que en la actualidad es de 6 meses para campesinos pobres y también para obreros, para otros es 1 año, pero también hay que ser flexibles. [...] luego esta dirección es la que debe emitir una decisión de aceptación o no; la Dirección Central sólo ve las reincorporaciones. Al ingresar en las células deben hacer una promesa." 24 According to the document the candidate's letter detailing all relevant personal data and documenting his intention to enter the party marked the beginning of the official selection process. Two active members had to vouch for this request. Once the respective local or regional committee approved the request the pre-militancia, or probation period, of six to twelve months started. In case of a positive assessment by the committee at the end of this period the candidate had to hand in another written de claration, the so called promesa. With the promesa the candidate became a member, committing himself to unconditional obedience and loyalty to the leadership and declaring his disposition to sacrifice his life for the party.
25
But how did the candidates attain the necessary positive decision of the party functionaries? This is where and how the mechanisms two and three observed by Weinstein complemented each other: indoctrination and action. SL had a strong interest to convince its future cadres of its political and ideological principles. Probably the most important instrument to achieve this goal were the so-called escuelas populares. The party gathered groups of future members and of the local population in classrooms, barns, marketplaces, etc. in order to conduct political classes and training. Party statistics show that, for instance, only between March 1990 and January 1991 more than 2.470 escuelas populares including 16.957 participants had been con-ducted throughout the country. 26 According to an undated document of Socorro Popular, one of the major party sub-organizations operating in Lima, escuelas populares could be realized to address specific occupational and social groups: Out of 314 escuelas populares with a total number of 1.438 participants thirty had been organized only for female workers, two for peasants, thirty-three for male workers, sixteen for street vendors, hundred for intellectuals, four for students, and twelve for lawyers.
27
Complementing the ideological curricula future party members also needed to demonstrate their commitment by participating in all kinds of party activities. At the beginning the aspirants normally carried out low-risk actions such as participating in demonstrations or road-blockings, painting graffities, and small errands. Once they executed this kind of duties in a satisfactory manner the candidates could be trusted with high-risk duties ranging from armed robbery to assassinations.
After the successful affiliation new members could rise through the ranks and make their way up the ladder -theoretically. Actually, leadership positions were highly restricted and the vast majority of party members remained subjected to directives. This fact found its formal expression in the distinction between militantes, cuadros, and dirigentes. While militante referred basically to all full party members, more experienced, well-trained members with some degree of authority were called cuadros. Dirigentes, finally, were exclusively those leaders with control of greater party or military units and who occupied the top party ranks. 28 The diligent selection of new cadres provided the party with a maximum of control and cohesion. However, several party documents indicate that the recruiting process deteriorated in the second half of the eighties. Presumably, the reason for that development was the deteriorating military situation that forced SL to retreat from various areas leaving the party with a smaller reservoir of recruits. In 1989 the party leadership demanded the enhancement of the recruiting process in Lima complaining that too many "personas de diversos criterios" had been granted membership. 29 In the department of Ayacucho regional party leaders complained about unqualified new members that stood out only for exercising excessive force.
32
Motivation and age structure of the senderistas
In her analysis about the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional and SL Cynthia McClintock concludes that the spark, which ignited the revolutionary fire in the Peruvian case, was the economic crisis the country experienced. 33 McClintock writes: "The guerrillas bemoan the hunger, malnutrition, and generally abject conditions of living and dying in Peru, and they also contend that the Peruvian government is responsible for these conditions." 34 Newly available testimonies of senderistas to the Peruvian Truth Commission confirm McClintock's findings. In their testimonies the respondents describe the poor economic conditions they perceived and how the situation motivated them to actively contribute to political and economic change. Reviewing the explanations of many senderistas it becomes apparent that the economic situation was perceived as poor and unjust not only in the late seventies or early eighties but rather at all times. A respondent describes the outcome of the inflation in the second half of the eighties: "Desde 1985 hasta 1986 hay una mayor opresión con el gobierno de Alan García, mucho recuerdo que mis padres siempre estilaban dejar las ganancias del pollo en su colchón, hasta que un día en 1988, vino el paquetazo terrible, vi a mis padres, que estaban juntando un capital para modernizarnos, todo quedó allí y se redujo enormemente." 35 Although this and many other testimonies permit to suppose that many members of SL were drawn to the organization by the economic hardship 30 they experienced or, at least, perceived, scholars have attributed this kind of motivation particularly to those members with a higher education or universitarian background. A recognized interpretation assumes that the economic decline Peru experienced frustrated the social rise students had aspired, making them prone to SL's ideological and political agenda. 36 Between 1960 and 1980 Peru experienced a dramatic rise of students that was confronted with an above-average unemployment rate of college and university graduates in the eighties. 37 Hence an entire student generation faced an unexpected severe economic environment. Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten state: "Many Students came from poor peasant families and hoped that, once graduated teachers, they can move beyond the social and economic situation of their parents. However, the only job that turns out to be available, and badly paid at that, is schoolteacher, often in the very village they came from. Thus they must go back to the same poverty from which they had hoped to escape by means of their university education."
38
But as a teacher in the public education system the situation was even more frustrating:
"The people's war [...] became for the teachers who worked in the countryside the only genuine solution for Peruvian Society. The deep frustration of blocked aspirations and a future perspective without any hope of improvement, led to a growing militancy among the teachers."
39
A former teacher and party member whose own economic situation significantly deteriorated after 1990 underscores the plausibility of this assumption: Even though little data on the age structure of SL is available, its strong academic background indicates that the bigger part of the organization was less than thirty years old at the moment of the recruiting. During a land occupation by about three hundred SL activists and sympathizers eyewitnesses estimated the average age of the vast majority to be between twenty and thirty. 41 According to Peter Johnson within rural communities SL attracted especially the peasant's sons and daughters aged between fifteen and twenty-five. 42 Analyzing the social characteristics of prisoners detained in Lima because of delicts related to terrorism a study conducted in 1989 concludes that fifty-seven percent of this group were younger than twenty-five. 43 Based on the duration of the jail sentences the Truth Commission reached the conclusion that around eighty percent of about 700 imprisoned senderistas could be considered "jóvenes" at the moment of their conviction, i.e. being supposedly younger than twenty-five years. 44 In her recent analysis about imprisoned senderistas Andrea Portugal concludes that sixty-two percent of the reviewed people had been younger than thirty years at the moment of their detention. Within this group fifty-five percent were aged between twenty and twenty-nine years followed by another group of almost twenty-six percent between thirty and thirty-nine years. 45 This data confirm existing estimations stating that cadres younger than twenty-five years at least dominated the lower and middle ranks of the party. 46 However, against the background of the country's general demographic development SL's age structure does not seem too sur- 41 
Financial resources
Surprisingly, the vast majority of scholars have left the question how SL financed its armed battle unattended. Mostly one finds vague references to the organization's supposed involvement in the national drug trafficking and, as a result, the alleged high earnings. There are various reasons why such a strong focus on the drug trafficking seems problematic. First of all it narrows the analytical perspective too much leaving aside the possible existence of other, maybe even more lucrative, financial sources. And still we lack any detailed analysis on how much money the drug trafficking really generated, through which channels the money flowed, and in which cash boxes it finally ended up. Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider the drug trafficking as a significant, yet not the only financial source the organization could rely on. However, it is necessary to underline that due to scarce data a detailed breakdown of SL's entire internal financial architecture is still impossible. On the basis of the data reviewed for this article we can assume the following with high probability: 1. SL only possessed a thin financial ceiling that covered its expenses scarcely and that was composed of different sources that had to be made accessible time and again. 2. Only a very small circle of party leaders had intimate knowledge of the party finances. 3. The majority of all financial transactions were realized with the smallest possible and purposely inconsistent administrative effort (hindering any analysis). The complexity of the financial structure shines through in a statement made by Guzmán's successor, Feliciano. Asked to describe who exactly managed the party finances, he said: "no sólo a mi no se me rindió cuentas, sino es que no se rindió cuentas a nadie del Buró Político ni del Comité Central."
48 Why did such an untransparent construction exist? We can only guess: Maybe the leadership wanted to prevent the police from discovering all party accounts with one single operation. Maybe Guzmán tried to monopolize this kind of knowledge in order to protect and enforce his claim to power. Once the financial status had been transparent to the party Guzmán and his top lieutenants might have been confronted with critical inquiries as to why ammunition and arms were scarce or, on the contrary, as to how they expected to succeed with empty wallets. But given the 47 "El Perú. Una población joven": Quehacer 55 (Lima 1988), p. 64-71, here: p. 65f. 48 Sala Penal Nacional, Exp. 560-03, Acta de la Duodécima Sesión (17/11/2005). described opaqueness almost nobody was able to acquire sound knowledge about the financial situation -thus creating a growing dependency from the central leadership.
Drug trafficking
Previous studies estimate the yearly revenues resulting from the party's engagement in the national drug trafficking to range between ten and hundred million dollars describing them as the party's "principal source of [...] economic resources" 49 . Small SL units had been infiltrating the Valle del Alto Huallaga (VAH) in the early eighties. Since the seventies the VAH had become Peru's biggest growing area for coca producing up to sixty percent of the national crop by the late eighties. 50 However, neither the exact point in time when SL started its engagement nor the exact scales of its involvement are clear. Although some observers reported first party activities in the first half of the eighties, 51 an intelligence memorandum from 1984 reached the opposite conclusion:
"En lo que se refiere a estas relaciones [el narcotráfico, SCW], si bien el accionar subversivo y el narcotráfico, coinciden en el uso de las mismas áreas geográficas, como es el caso de Tinga María, San Francisco, etc., sin embargo no existen evidencias que permitan determinar un entendimiento."52 Whensoever the starting point was, it looks as if the drug trafficking engagement was debated highly controversial inside the party leadership. Officially the central leadership disapproved any direct involvement and any indirect gaining from the drug trafficking. However, it accepted coca growing as a corner stone of the peasant's livelihood. A report drafted after a meeting of the central leadership with the regional committee of the VAH in April 1989 states: 49 "no estamos en contra del cultivo de la coca (tiene elementos nutritivos, da energía) pero nos oponemos al narcotráfico, las masas en el Perú consumen la coca; clave para combatir erradicación de la coca, nunca le quites a la masa un medio de vida si no le das otro, si no aplicamos esta política nos apartamos de las masas, es una defensa de la masa y buen tiempo por delante lo usará como medio de subsistencia, más si cada vez mayor gente viene a esta zona para cultivar coca, pensar que esta situación específica nos va a contraponer directamente contra el imperialismo." 53 Apparently the leadership did not advocate for an autonomous engagement but rather recommended to avoid any confrontation with the drug traffickers and to establish a peaceful co-existence of both groups. In a response to a report by the Huallaga-Committee the central committee declared in 1986:
"Sobre el problema de los narcotaficantes: el acuerdo del CC [Comité Central, SCW] es no atacarlos, ellos trabajan por su propia cuenta y nosotros por la nuestra, no golperarlos para que no suceda lo de Colombia que armaron grupos armados para atacar a la guerrilla." 54 But as reality showed this nonaggression treaty soon turned into a rational business relationship through which both sides looked for a maximum of economic profit. Oscar Alberto Ramírez Durand testified that the comrades operating in the growing areas were motivated at an early stage to ask the drug traffickers to support the armed struggle. In order to prevent its own troops from turning into mercenaries they were, initially, ordered not to ask for financial assistance but rather for weapons, medicine, and equipment. 55 With its growing geographical and political consolidation in the VAH in the second half of the eighties SL established itself as the central regional control body charging fees and tariffs for all relevant aspects of the drug business.
Once it actively engaged in the drug trafficking SL aimed to control all parts of the supply-chain: from the cultivation to the selling of the coca leafs up to the access to secret runways from which the drugs were flown out of Peru. SL's engagement is illustrated by internal documents and many testimonies of former senderistas and of drug traffickers. In a "Balance y reajuste de la lucha reivindicativa" dating from December 10 th of 1990, which was signed by the Huallaga-Committee and apparently authorized by the central leadership, the terms of the coca business were specified: Among other things fixed prices for an arroba of coca leafs and the use of a specially calibrated balance were determined. All tariffs had to be paid in cash immediately. In principle all foreign drug traffickers were allowed to operate in the VAH. However, they needed to pay a yearly registration fee of 15.000 U.S. Dollars. Additionally, tariffs had to be paid for accessing and using clandestine runways. Strikingly, the leadership urged to push on with the construction of an own airport -apparently, the traffic volume was significant. 56 In his testimony to the Truth Commission the drug trafficker Demetrio Chávez Peñaherrera explained that drug companies had to pay biannual concessions worth 15.000 U.S. Dollars in order to pursue their business. Chávez also made clear that drug traffickers had not only to pay 300 U.S. Dollars per kilo of pasta básica de cocaína (PBC) but also to collaborate with goods such as medicine, boots, clothes, or motor vehicles.
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Although SL's active engagement is indisputable, the empirical evidence still does not allow for an exact assessment of the total revenue it made out of it nor what part of the revenues went to the central leadership in Lima. Taking the "Balance" from 1990 as a basis it is possible to get a first idea of the redistribution. From the 15.000 U.S. Dollars that were taken as a concession fifty percent went to the party (without specifying whether that meant the local, the regional or the central committee), forty percent covered the expenses for technical infrastructure, and ten percent covered costs for ammunition and the operating costs of the local party unit. The tariff paid in order to use the runways (and which amount is unclear) was distributed in the following way: five percent were used for the maintenance of the runways, the remaining ninety-five percent went to the Comité de Células del Bolsón, that had to cover e.g. its expenses for healthcare. It seems plausible that the Huallaga-Committee was the party unit with the biggest financial resources. Testimonies made by the party top leadership back such an assumption: Toward close party leaders Abimael Guzmán spoke of a contribution by the Huallaga-Committee of about one million Soles.
58 And a document of the first party congress in 1988 specifically praised the financial contributions of that committee: "El Partido se autofinancia, se autosostiene, con un trabajo económico especial y con aportes de algunas bases, entre ellas hay que destacar Huallaga; sí, es lo que soporta un fuerte peso económico." 59 Recent studies suggest that the bigger part of the revenues were kept in the cash boxes of the Huallaga-Committee -maybe due to the apparent moral refusal of Abimael Guzmán to use drug trafficking in order to foster SL's financial situation. 60 But it remains speculation whether SL's leader was really plagued by such scruple. Bearing in mind his pragmatic command over Sendero a testimony of Feliciano appears quite plausible:
"después de todo [Abimael Guzmán, SCW] no le hacía ojitos cuando le llegaba el dinero, o sea él recibía, además una organización de este tipo siempre necesita una economía pero que ese dinero provenía en el caso del Huallaga de las firmas de narcotraficantes no hay duda."
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Other financial resources
In order to mobilize financial resources SL not solely relied on drug trafficking. All party units were asked to open up new ways of generating financial assets and to deliver a part of it to the central leadership. As a document from 1988 underlines:
"los aparatos cuando tienen un dinero, la parte mayoritaria es para la Dirección Central, porque es para todo el Partido, la minoritaria es para el aparato; y en segundo lugar, una cosa más importante, hay que dar cuentas." 62 Although most party units followed this order, the central leadership mostly received only very small and irregular amounts. Feliciano describes the mismatch between the official central claim and the financial reality of many regional committees:
"pero al fin y al cabo nosotros tampoco rendíamos cuentas porque los comités tenían muy pocos ingresos, no sé si otros comités habrán tenido ingresos, pero en el caso del Centro y Ayacucho donde he estado teníamos muy pocos ingresos, y muy pocas veces hacíamos llegar dinero al Comité Central así que tampoco rendíamos cuentas." 63 Several reports sent from regional committees to the central command in Lima demonstrate that most transactions were relatively small. In May 1992 the Comité Zonal Sur Medio reported a transfer of 590 Soles or U.S. Dollars to Lima, part of which was meant to support the party's journal El Diario. 64 It remains unknown how often such transaction were realized. A memorandum of the Comité Regional del Norte, apparently from the same time period, confirms the assignment of 700 U.S. Dollars and 300 Soles and agrees on a further assignment on the occasion of the "next contact" with the central leadership. With only two to four of such meetings a year and with potentially unchanged amounts only marginal revenues could be expected at the end of the year. The same document also describes how limited the local financial resources were and what modest measures were taken in order to improve the financial situation:
"Hemos planificado dos campañas económicas para abastecernos de economía, venta de útiles escolares para la campaña escolar y venta de cassetes del Partido (canciones y poemas) que a la vez sirve de propagana del arte proletario, nos va a ligar con las masas y tener economía. Los cassetes vamos a reproducirlos ya que tenemos innumerables pedidos del campo y la ciudad. El aparato económico de Piura no funciona porque tienen problemas de inversión, hace meses que no cotiza. El zonal principal va a explotar oro, y el zonal de Cajamarca igualmente, además van a confiscar de una mina de oro de Bolívar para poder tener economía." 65 Not only had the regional committees tried to generate money, but also other party units. The Grupo de Apoyo Partidario, for instance, realized so called polladas or cebichadas, where roast chicken and fish dishes were sold. This kind of public events brought a monthly return of around 100 Soles. 66 A report of the Policía de Investigación from 1985 lists kidnapping, selling of propaganda materials, and extortion as sources of money. 67 The selling of propaganda materials was also confirmed by a report of the Guardia Civil from the same year. The same report also indicated the possibility of international financial support to SL. 68 However, international governmental support seems unlikely: SL categorically rejected all foreign aid and there is no empirical evidence for such support so far. Peruvian politicians often publically suspected foreign agents to support SL. In contrast to these kind of public claims the national intelligence service SIN had already ruled out any foreign support in a report from 1985: "Los estudios del accionar de Sendero Luminoso en el transcurso del año 1984, no mostraron indicaciones que evidenciaran el apoyo externo (económico y material)."
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According to the same report the only foreign support SL received were revenues from selling propaganda materials in the U.S. and Europe.
The difficulty to exactly identify all different sorts of financial sources and the total amount of all financial transactions has become apparent. However, several preliminary conclusions can be reached: SL depended on several financial sources to successfully carry through its fight. These different sources generated different earnings of which the drug trafficking was the most lucrative one while others covered incurring costs only scantly. It remains difficult to estimate the revenues resulting from drug trafficking and their distribution within SL. In order to strengthen its control the party leadership developed a strong interest in controlling the financial situation of each and every party unit and to keep its own financial conduct secret. All in all SL was not able to establish a permanently solid and growing financial basis that would have allowed for a consistent and satisfactory money supply for the whole of the party. This defective pattern became especially noticeable regarding an area that can be considered the Achilles' heel of any combat organization: the armament.
Armament
In order to carry through successfully its armed battle SL not only needed an efficient recruitment process and satisfactory financial resources but also adequate armament. Being a guerrilla force SL normally tried to avoid huge military confrontations and instead preferred smaller actions such as skirmishes, sabotage, selective assassinations, and armed assaults. In consequence the necessary armory was manageable: rifles, handguns, dynamite, machetes, lances, and arrows built the bigger part of the arsenal. Additionally SL also possessed some machineguns and mortars. In general SL had three options to acquire its weapons: 1. the global black-market arms trade, 2. own productions, 3. the capture of weapons from the military opponents or from private institutions.
As seen above, SL's financial situation was tense. Since the party leadership could not ignore this unpleasant factor it tried to communicate it to its ranks. At the party congress in 1988 Abimael Guzmán identified problems with the procurement of weapons and explained that the money had been spent instead for propaganda. 70 Only one year later Guzmán briefly commented on foreign speculations that SL had acquired weapons through the global black-market arms trade: "nosotros no tenemos esos millones de dólares."
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All in all an active engagement on the global black-market arms trade, which would have required substantial investments, seems quite unlikely. But how did SL acquire them? According to Guzmán SL had to follow Chairman Mao's guideline and capture its weapons from its opponents. Asked in the so-called "interview of the century" of 1988 what measures he would carry through in order to enhance the armament of the revolutionary army Guzmán responded:
"En cuanto a lo referente a las armas, el Presidente [Mao, SCW] nos decía que las armas las tiene el enemigo, en consecuencia el problema es arrancárselas y, eso es lo principal; y las armas modernas son necesarias pero funcionan según la ideología del hombre que las maneja, eso ya nos enseñó Lenin. [...] En consecuencia, hace tiempo ya ha comenzado el creciente traspaso de armas de ellos a nosotros y ellos tienen la obligación de traérnoslas, es su obligación y llevárnoslas a donde estemos y hay que reconocer, comienzan a cumplir. Entonces, las armas del enemigo, arrancándoselas, son nuestra principal fuente. La humilde dinamita, además, seguirá cumpliendo un buen papel y las minas son armas del pueblo y nosotros [...]. Bien, esto lleva a una segunda cuestión, la elaboración de medios; estamos esforzándonos por avanzar en la confección de medios y ya ellos, también conocen muy bien, las notificaciones directas en Palacio de Gobierno, lanzadas con morteros hechos con nuestras propias manos, con las manos del pueblo, no lo dicen pero lo sabemos. El otro medio usual es el de la compra, porque son tres las formas: la principal arrancárselas al enemigo, la segunda confeccionarlas y el tercero comprarlas. En esto se tiene problemas por el alto costo de las armas y nosotros llevamos adelante la guerra popular más económica de la Tierra, así es porque tenemos muy escasos medios que son los que las masas nos proveen." The answer is revealing: Firstly, it can be again interpreted as a hint that SL was not able to operate on the global black-market arms trade. Instead Guzmán names alternative possibilities: Capturing weapons from the enemy was the most important element. Another alternative was to produce the weapons by oneself, meaning especially mortars, ammunition and explosive devices. Yet another option was to assault mines in order to capture dynamite.
The most important source for capturing weapons were the arsenals of the state security forces. In order to access those arsenals SL had to engage in military confrontation such as small assaults on patrols or police stations. These kinds of actions had to be planned properly not least because SL's main combat units possessed only little man and fire power. According to Alberto Oscar Ramírez Durand the total number of available weapons was always smaller that the total number of combatants. He also bemoans the significant regional differences in the supply of weapon:
"En Sendero siempre hubo más gente que armas, siempre fue así, había cuatro fusiles con diez o catorce balas en total para cada zona pero no juntas, eso pertmitía que la fuerza principal se moviera, sólo había armas en el Huallaga por la cercanía con el narcotráfico, en eso había una mano negra, para mí son mercenarios y hasta al Ejército le compraban armas, siempre les sobró dinero." 73 An example of deficient armament was the regional committee of Ayacucho to which he was assigned in 1985:
"Pedidos: Solicitamos la última vez, que se nos facilite una munición de los morteros fabricados por el Partido, reiteramos el pedido, si no hubiese, aunque sea, se nos de un diseño de la munición para intentar fabricarla, pues el mortero lo tenomos en desuso por falta de municiones." 76 Apparently the regional committee did not possess the expertise to produce ammunition. Hence a sensitive dependency from Lima existed that could significantly restrict the regional military capabilities. The party leadership knew about that kind of problems, but was not able to offer any enhancement of the supply. Instead it demanded better military training and more efficient use of ammunition. However, these claims were justified quite strangely. In 1987 Abimael Guzmán explained the excessive usage of ammunition with a deficit of ideological commitment indicating at the same time the desirable future ratio for the exchange of fire:
"Desarrollar destreza en el tiro [...] es cuestión de odio de clase no de buen o mal ojo, tenemos pocas armas y munición escasa, la puntería es clave, la norma es: un tiro = un hombre, el derroche no es característica de un ejército revolucionario." 77 Although Guzmán's vision seems odd, it was absolutely needful. Party documents from 1991 reveal a precarious supply situation. 78 According to documents the Comité Metropolitano and Socorro Popular only possessed twentysix rifles and handguns. This number is staggering since SL had been expanding its Lima operations since the end of the eighties. However, the increment seems due especially to the use of dynamite of which the Lima units possessed 15.000 cartridges. Dynamite was specifically useful for spectacular actions that caused widespread public fear. But SL could not win its struggle relying only on dynamite. Without rifles, handguns or mortars assaults on army and police posts or selective assassinations could not have been carried out. But analyzing the ratio of weapons and ammunition it becomes clear that SL had to avoid full-fledged military confrontations with the security forces: In general average (with the exception of the Huallaga-Committee) SL only possessed ninety-one cartridges per machinegun, twenty-one cartridges per rifle, and eight cartridges per handgun. These numbers made any serious military operation impossible. It seems quiteirritating that Abimael Guzmán announced the "strategic equilibrium" only a few months after these numbers had been aggregated. According to Mao, or rather Guzmán, "strategic equilibrium" meant that the military adversaries would be on par with each other, hence possessing the same military strength and resources. Based on the reviewed figures it is apparent that SL did not even rudimentarily possess that military strength in 1991 (and maybe not even before). The public proclamation of the "strategic equilibrium", then, was either a clever maneuver in order to camouflage the organization's weakness or a disastrous misjudgment.
Concluding remarks
SL had to mobilize permanently a certain amount of different resources. As we have seen, he did so in different ways and with different success.
Recruitment
Recruitment proved to be especially successful. Through the implementation of various control mechanisms the admission procedure was organized extremely strictly and divided into different stages. Against the background of an elitist self-conception the intended purpose of the recruitment process was to attract only the most qualified and most committed candidates. As a result SL at no time had more than 4.000 members -different estimations can be considered incorrect.
79 SL never pursued the aim of becoming a mass organization; the small number of party members can therefore not be interpreted as a sign of a deficient recruitment strategy.
The highly sophisticated recruitment process was an indication of the excellent organizational capabilities SL possessed. This competence may be considered its most important achievement. With it SL was able to translate the individual discontent with the political and economic situation of its members into a collective and armed protest. As we saw the economic decline pushed many of its members toward SL. However, the same testimonies highlighted the fact that SL was perceived as being the only political party able to offer an ideological fundament and organizational apparatus with which to start an armed endeavor.
Financial resources
Mobilizing financial resources was less successful. Although we still lack satisfactory data the reviewed documents confirm that SL was not able to 79 Cynthia McClintock estimates the amount of party members to be almost 10.000; see McClintock, Revolutionary Movements (note 33), p. 74. meet its financial requirements as needed. Probably the most lucrative source for money was the drug trafficking. Although the party leadership always denied any involvement in it, SL actively benefited from drug trafficking through collecting fees and tariffs. Little is known about the actual amount of money resulting from the illegal trade. Other party units were constantly asked to transfer money to the capital. But mostly the amounts of money generated locally were small and sporadic.
The financial situation remained a weak point and SL was not able to fight the permanent scarcity of equipment and armament in its committees or to create any durable reserves. Contrary to some assumptions it looks as if SL (with the probable exception of the Huallaga-Committee) was not able to offer its members any material or financial incentives. 80 
Armament
The weak financial situation affected the party's capability to arm itself and the weak armament remained a constant debility of SL. However, it was able to diminish it through adapting its military tactics. As David Palmer pointed out, SL conceived its struggle predominantly as a political and not military endeavor and most of its activities followed that logic. 81 Fullfledged military confrontations were avoided whenever possible. Instead SL engaged more in small-sized actions like selective assassinations or blowing up power supply lines. These kinds of assaults had substantial psychological effect, especially in urban centers. Launching several attacks in one single day increased the public impression of an omnipresent organization and camouflaged its military weakness. Attacks on critical infrastructure immediately affected the population by interrupting water or electricity supply. At the same time they demonstrated the State's incapacity to guarantee public order. Against the background of the growing institutional weakness of the Peruvian State and an escalating economic crisis the public myth was born of "Sendero ganador". 82 
